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Abstract:  Competitiveness in the foreign exchange market depends on both country and
firm-specific factors. Country-specific factors in the form of the importance in the foreign
exchange market of the home currency and the home regulatory and legal system explain
much; of the two the legal and regulatory system appears more critical. Firm-specific factors
in the form of the size and international reach of the banks that make the market play a
role. When the domestic market is particularly rivalrous, in the sense that firms face strong
domestic competitors, that itself is an important factor. Still nothing is absolute; some
banks overcome national weakness and some banks do not live up to the potential inherent
in their national origin. Lastly, a bank’s competitiveness tends to persist in time and to
extend across even to unrelated currency markets.
This paper was presented at the Wharton Financial Institutions Center’s conference on The
Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.2
Country and Firm Sources of International Competitiveness: The Case of
the Foreign Exchange Market
Abstract
Competitiveness in the foreign exchange market depends on both country and
firm-specific factors. Country-specific factors in the form of the importance in the
foreign exchange market of the home currency and the home regulatory and
legal system explain much; of the two the legal and regulatory system appears
more critical. Firm-specific factors in the form of the size and international reach
of the banks that make the market play a role. When the domestic market is
particularly rivalrous, in the sense that firms face strong domestic competitors,
that itself is an important factor. Still nothing is absolute; some banks overcome
national weakness and some banks do not live up to the potential inherent in
their national origin. Lastly, a bank’s competitiveness tends to persist in time
and to extend across even to unrelated currency markets.
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Country and Firm Sources of International Competitiveness: The Case of
the Foreign Exchange Market
1.0 Competing in one of the world’s largest markets
The foreign exchange market currently trades over US$1.2 trillion per day
and is one of the world’s oldest markets -- being almost as old as money itself.
Even today the foreign exchange market is one of the few in which commercial
and investment banks from all countries participate to some degree. It is also one
in which banks from several countries are important competitors. The banks’
trading operations are located in many cities around the world and trading
moves around the world almost continuously throughout the 24-hour day.
Together, these characteristics make the foreign exchange market one of the most
international markets of all.
Despite the size and importance of the market, the economics literature on
the firms that comprise the market is almost non-existent. Typically, the
economics literature has pursued the issue of the determinants of foreign
exchange rates while the finance literature has pursued the issue of the efficiency
of the market. However, and except for two notable studies that I discuss in
Section 3 (Holmes et al., 1991 and Zaheer 1995), the scholarly literature on
sources of competitiveness in the foreign exchange market is nil. This is
particularly unfortunate from the point of view of research: banking is
everywhere a highly regulated industry but foreign exchange trading is an
activity that almost all national regulatory authorities consider a part of banking.4
The foreign exchange market then permits one to observe the influence of the
domestic regulatory system on international competitiveness.
In the four substantive sections that follow I examine country and firm
sources of competitiveness in the foreign exchange market. Essentially I propose
and test some hypotheses concerning the role and relative importance of several
factors, some of which are country and some of which are firm-specific in nature.
In Section 2, below I examine how the banks make the foreign exchange
markets. First I describe the structure of the market. Then I discuss how banks
profit from trading in foreign exchange. Lastly, I conclude the section with a
description of the size of the market in London, New York and Tokyo.
In Section 3, I propose some factors that might determine competitiveness.
The country-specific factors I discuss are the international importance of the
domestic currency and the nature of the domestic legal system while the firm-
specific factors are the size of the bank and the extent of its international
presence. Plus, when a country generates several firms that are themselves
competitive, rivalry may spur further competitiveness.
In Section 4, I subject the hypothesized factors to tests. The measure of a
firm’s competitiveness is a score based on the firm’s rank in Euromoney’s annual
survey of foreign exchange markets. (The firms in this study are almost all
commercial banks though some US investment banks do appear.) Clearly a large
number of US firms appear in the rankings because of the importance of the US$.
Other countries have fewer ranked banks because their currencies play a smaller5
role in the world’s financial system. Countries such as the US, UK, Canada,
Australia and Hong Kong, with legal and regulatory systems based on common
law, also appear to have more ranked banks than do countries such as France,
Germany and Japan, with legal and regulatory systems based on code law.
Next, to control for country effects I look across banks but within countries
and find that larger banks tend to have higher rank-scores. I also find that the
greater the number of the major financial centers that each bank operates in the
higher the bank’s rank-scores.
When I combine country and firm-specific factors, the most important factor
in explaining firms’ rank-scores is the competitiveness of the domestic industry.
Banks such as Chase Manhattan that have capable competitors such as Citibank
or Bank of America are themselves capable; banks such as Banque Nationale de
Paris that have weak domestic competitors are themselves weak.
Also, it is more important to be a large, international bank from a country
with a common law legal system than to be a large, international bank from a
country with an important domestic currency. That is, Royal Bank of Canada has
a higher rank-score than Dresdner Bank.
In Section 5, I investigate the transferability of competitiveness over time and
to other currency markets. Briefly, the results suggest that competitiveness
follows a random walk; Barclays Bank’s rank-score in the 1990-94 period equals
its rank-score in the 1985-89 period, plus noise. This persistence does not permit
us to infer a lack of competition. Rather, the persistence suggests that6
competitiveness follows from many factors each of which contributes only a
portion to the final outcome.
Furthermore the results suggest that competitiveness in home-currency
markets (say ¥en/US$ for Chase Manhattan) carries over to competitiveness in
third-currency markets (say ¥en/Deutsche Mark, again for Chase Manhattan).
The banks that are high among the Top 20 banks overall tend to be among the
Top 10 in third-currency markets.
2.0 Banks make the foreign exchange market
2.1 The banks deal with each other and with their customers
The foreign exchange market exists as a market for the exchange of national
means of payment, primarily demand deposits but also currency. There is no
floor or exchange; instead participants communicate electronically through
phones and terminals.
The foreign exchange market actually consists of two markets, the interbank
(wholesale) and the customer (retail) markets, which meet in the commercial
banks. In the interbank market, dealers at banks trade with each other directly or
through brokers. Some non-banks such as investment banks, central banks and
major trading companies also participate in this wholesale market. As a rule of
thumb and brokers aside, what distinguishes participants in the interbank7
market is the willingness and obligation to quote two-way (bid-ask or buy-sell)
prices to other interbank participants.
The participants in the customer market are all the firms and individuals
that have recourse to the foreign exchange markets but who do not themselves
trade as a line of business. Rather, customers engage in trading in support of
their primary businesses. Major categories of customers include commodities
dealers, multinational companies, nonbank financial companies and
multinational petroleum companies. As a rule of thumb, customers do not ask
the banks for two-way quotes (because they are not willing or able to
reciprocate) but instead specify whether they are buying or selling.
Commercial banks are key to the functioning of the foreign exchange market
because only banks can issue demand deposits. Even non-bank participants in
the wholesale market must ultimately pass their transactions through banks.
2.2 The banks make profits in four ways
Essentially, banks make profits from four activities, listed here in order of
increasing risk: arbitrage, executing transactions for clients, market-making and
position-taking. Arguably, the most profitable activities are transactions and
market-making, both activities that consist of performing services for others
(Grubel 1993). Although performing services for others may not be highly
profitable on a per transactions basis, the volume of transactions is large.8
Arbitrage consists of profiting from discrepancies between
contemporaneous prices in different markets. By definition, arbitrage is riskless
as the dealer simultaneously buys in one market while selling in another.
Arbitrage profits are fleeting and generally small per unit traded and are usually
a by-product of dealers’ constant monitoring of prices across markets separated
by geography or instruments but linked by economic relationships. For instance,
the price of the US$ in terms of Deutsche Marks should equal the price of the
US$ in ¥en, adjusted for the exchange rate between ¥en and Deutsche Marks. An
analogy to arbitrage profit is keeping an eye out for money on the pavement
while walking along the streets of a city. One cannot make a living this way but
one can find some coins and the occasional note.
Transactions comprise the execution of payment instructions. Every day
individuals and firms receive payments in foreign currencies and make
payments to firms and individuals in foreign currencies. Each of these
transactions requires an exchange of one means of payment for another. Only
banks may issue demand deposits and so only banks can execute transactions for
others; even US investment banks must ultimately instruct a commercial bank to
make the requisite payments. State Street Bank has divested itself of most
commercial banking activities but has retained its bank charter because access to
the payment system is important to the bank’s success in its specialization in the
processing of transactions.9
The banks charge fees for the transmission and execution of the payment
instructions. Also, when the banks exchange one means of national payment for
another the banks receive the bid-ask spread, buying one currency at their bid
and selling the other at their ask. Furthermore, executing transactions enhances
the banks’ ability to make markets.
Market-making is the service of providing liquidity or immediacy.
Frequently individuals and firms wish to transact immediately and not wait for
the arrival of a counter-party with the opposite requirements. The bank steps in
as the counter-party, agreeing to buy the ¥en for US dollars, for instance, in the
expectation that shortly someone will come along and wish to sell dollars for
¥en. Banks that receive a large, continuous flow of customers’ orders to buy and
sell can accept mismatches in their positions, confident that the flow of orders
will ensure that the mismatch is temporary. When making the market, the bank’s
buys at its bid and sells at its ask and the bid-ask spread then compensates the
bank for assuming two risks.
The first risk is that prices will change in the period between when the bank
accepts the position and when it ends it. The expected value of the position is
small (changes are as likely to favor the position as to reduce its value) and equal
to the difference in the cost of borrowing in the two currencies involved.
The second and more important risk is that the bank’s counterparty knows
something that the bank does not. Then the bank will lose. If the bank knows
more than its counterparty, the bank wins. At a first approximation then, banks10
simply transfer profits from uninformed traders to informed traders.
Uninformed or liquidity traders (firms and individuals conducting buying or
selling foreign exchange as an ancillary activity to real need and without
expectations about price changes) pay the bid-ask spread. Informed traders
(speculators) only buy or sell when they believe prices are wrong. Speculators
earn a return that compensates them for their investment in information with
which to price currencies. The bank sets its bid-ask spread so that its gains from
uninformed traders cover its loses to informed traders.
Position-taking is the glamorous part of the foreign exchange market.
Dealers, through their purchase and sale of currencies, bet on the direction that
exchange rates will take. In position-taking, banks act as informed traders.
Position-taking is inherently a zero-sum activity. Every gain to one party (bank
or customer) represents a loss to the counter-party. When banks take positions
they act as speculators. However, banks do not need to engage in position-taking
and position-takers do not need to be banks.
The banks’ speculative profits, if the banks do speculate profitably, come
from three sets of participants: central banks, rogue traders, and uninformed
traders. Central banks frequently transact in the foreign exchange market with
macro-economic policy objectives rather than profit-making objectives. The
evidence is mixed, but suggests that central bank intervention in foreign
exchange markets is not profitable to the central banks.11
Recent bank failures and trading disasters (BCCI, Orange County, Barings
Bank, Daiwa Bank, Sumitomo Trading and many others) point out how the
failure of governance mechanisms are like a failed shut-off valve that permits
money to flow to the speculative activities of the counterparties. If the Bank of
England had ensured that the management of Barings had installed and used
standard risk control measures, Nicholas Leason would not have been able to
lose almost US$1 billion and 1995 would have been a less profitable year for
Barings’ counterparties (Tickell 1996).
Lastly, banks, when acting as speculators or informed traders, make profits
from uninformed traders, as do all other successful speculators (Grubel 1993).
Banks profit not only from their research but also from their position in the
wholesale market. Successful dealers are able to read the order flow in the
market and to profit from their knowledge. That informed traders earn their
profits from uninformed traders does not mean that uninformed traders are
being victimized (Grubel 1993). The uninformed traders benefit from the price
discovery process and receive the services of money exchange and immediacy.
2.3 The biggest markets are in London, New York and Tokyo
London is the primary center for foreign exchange trading, followed by New
York and Tokyo. Over 200 institutions are active in the US foreign exchange
market; of these some 30 are market makers in the major currencies (Holmes et12
al. 1991). Table 1a presents some statistics on the development of the size and
relative importance of the three markets since 1979.
Business hours in London, New York and Tokyo span 22.5 hours in the 24
hour day. Any institution with a branch in each center can trade almost
continuously in world-wide financial markets. Callier (1986) even makes a case
that large banks engaged in foreign exchange trading must be present in all three
centers. He argues that the ability to trade continuously facilitates the
management of the risk of open positions. Table 1b shows the evolution between
1970 and 1995 in the number of foreign banks in these three cities.
Improvements in communications mean that banks can move supporting
clerical operations to more remote and cheaper locations. However, the trading
rooms themselves tend to be in financial centers, suggesting the existence of
agglomeration economies.
3.0 Country and firm-specific factors contribute to competitiveness
Holmes et al. (1991), in the only study of competitiveness in foreign exchange
markets that I am aware off, categorize the factors into two categories, the banks’
endowed and acquired factors. For Holmes et al. (1991), a bank’s endowment
consists primarily of the characteristics of its home economy. These
characteristics include the size of the economy, its history, and its role in
international trade and finance. Other characteristics are the legal and regulatory13
framework that governs the firm and the domestic market, the organization of
the financial services industry and the degree of local competition. All of these
influence the role of the home currency in international markets. In addition, for
Holmes et al., the firm’s endowment includes the workforce’s training and
education and the firm’s traditional client base and lines of business.
The firm’s acquired characteristics are attributes that arise from past
management decisions in response to the firm’s endowment. Acquired
characteristics include: the branch network, the firm’s capitalization and
perceived creditworthiness, degree and history of internationalization, scale and
scope of existing foreign exchange operations, penetration into finance and
current service offerings of capital market instruments and attitudes towards
innovation and product development.
I prefer to classify factors into country and firm-specific factors. Country
factors are factors that are available to or affect all national firms. Firm-specific
factors are those factors that the firm possesses and that distinguish it from other
firms from the same country. Country-specific factors influence the prevalence
(both in terms of numbers and impact) of firms from specific countries in the
global market. Firm-specific factors influence which firms from any given
country will be particularly competitive in the global market. The two sets of
factors are not independent. Still country factors, although they condition
outcomes, do not absolutely determine outcomes. A firm from a weak national14
environment may still succeed in international competition and a firm from a
strong national environment may still fail.
Lastly, Hu (1995) points out that a firm’s advantages are always relative to
its competitors such that superiority at home does not necessarily mean
superiority abroad, or vice-versa. A firm may also be weak at home but strong
abroad, and vice versa. Hu also conjectures that in general, that the differences
between countries are probably greater than the differences between firms of the
same nationality, suggesting that country factors would dominate firm-specific
factors in importance as sources of advantage.
3.1 Country factors include the home currency and legal system
A vehicle currency is one that firms and individuals use for their
international transactions even though it is not their national currency (Krugman
1980). When a currency becomes a vehicle currency for the world or a region,
banks from the currency’s home country benefit.
The currencies that firms and individuals have chosen to use as vehicle
currencies typically have been the currencies of major trading nations such as the
UK or now the US. The large volumes of trade generate large volumes of
transactions. Large volumes of transactions denominated in US$ means that
banks trading in the US$ can spread their losses to informed traders over a very
large volume of uninformed traders and so keep their spreads narrow. Clearly,
once traders start to use a currency the process can be self-reinforcing. So many15
firms use the US$, that Mitsukoshi Department Store might find it cheaper (in
terms of transactions costs such as the bid-ask spread) when dealing with Louis
Vuitton to go from Japanese yen (¥en) to French francs (FFr) via the US$ than to
go directly via the small or even non-existent ¥en/FFr market. The bid-ask
spreads on the FFr/US$ and the ¥en/US$ together may be less than on the
¥en/FFr. Ultimately, a vehicle currency may retain its role long after the home
country has lost its commercial predominance. Sterling (£stg) remained important
long after the UK had lost its position as the most important trading nation in the
world. However, when the US became predominant after World War II, what
had been a virtuous circle for sterling became a vicious one as the US$ replaced
sterling in world trade and payments.
Related factors reinforced the role of the volume of transactions. Banks and
other firms in London and New York created liquid markets in short-term debt
instruments. This meant that the Treasurer of Mitsui Busan could easily manage
his firm’s £stg or US$ balances, investing short-term surpluses or borrowing to
cover short-term deficits. All this rested on a regulatory and legal infrastructure
conducive to contracting and trade.
One critical regulatory factor is the issue of non-resident convertibility. If a
currency is to be a vehicle currency non-residents must have the legal right to
hold balances in the currency and to transact freely in it. Although it is the
decisions of firms and individuals whether a currency becomes a vehicle
currency, governments hold a veto over the use of their own currency. For most16
of the post-World War II period the Japanese government, concerned about its
control over monetary policy and over the Balance of Payments, chose to restrict
the access of non-residents to the domestic currency. This hampered the ¥en from
becoming a vehicle currency.
Lastly, even geography has played a role in making the US$ today’s premier
vehicle currency. On any calendar day, the clearing (payments) system for ¥en
closes before the clearing system for sterling or Deutsche Mark (DM). These
clearing systems close before the clearing system for the US$. The reason is that
the world has agreed that a day starts at the international date line in the Pacific
Ocean. The implication is that the US$ has the longest day; firms can receive and
make payments on a stated day later in US$ than in any other major currency.
Banks benefit from their home currency being a vehicle currency through
their access to information and to the payments clearing system. The high volume
of transactions also helps amortize the fixed costs of establishing a foreign
exchange trading operation. Still, Holmes et al. (1991) suggest that because the
US$ is the main reserve currency and the currency against which other currencies
trade, US financial institutions cannot focus on a single dominant currency. This
has forced the US banks to develop expertise in a variety of currencies.
The legal and regulatory system can impact the ability of domestic firms to
compete internationally through the system’s effect on the ability of the domestic
firms to innovate. The legal and regulatory system affects how good the firms are
in crafting new instruments, contracts and practices to meet client needs. I would17
hypothesize that common law legal systems are better at fostering innovation
than are code law systems.
Numerous authors, for example Rybczynski (1984) and Walter (1992), have
contrasted market and bank-oriented financial systems. Recently Corbett and
Jenkinson (1996) have challenged the meaningfulness of this categorization, at
least regarding putative effects on the financing of industry. Allen (1993) accepts
the categorization but critiques the common association of bank-oriented systems
with more rapid economic growth than that evident in market-oriented systems
(Ellsworth 1985; Porter 1992). Still, Coleman’s (1994) analysis of political power
and the banking sector in France, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States ends up dichotomizing the systems into the familiar two categories.
He argues that, “To an extent not found in the Anglo-American countries, the
French and German banking policy communities were able to plan and steer their
responses to financial innovations and other pressures from the new international
markets.” According to Coleman, the two Continental European states saw a
slow, step-by-step introduction of innovations. The Anglo-American states had
many of the innovations first, with the regulators having to play catch-up.
Coleman expresses his doubt that twenty years of intense innovation have left the
Anglo-American financial services firms stronger than their French and German
counterparts. My results below suggest that the Anglo-American firms are more
competitive, at least in the foreign exchange market.18
The categorization of market and bank-oriented financial systems could
equally be a categorization of countries into common law and code law legal
systems. Unfortunately from the point of view of theoretical and empirical
research, one cannot untangle the two categorizations. The categorization of
Anglo-American and Continental Europe, is broadly descriptive though Japan
follows the code law and European pattern and Singapore, Malaysia and Hong
Kong follow the common law and Anglo-American pattern. I use the code and
common law dichotomy in the empirical work for two reasons. First, it has
theoretical content. Second, I have found it easier to operationalize than the
distinction between bank and market-oriented financial systems.
In common law systems, such as the US and the UK, the law tends to be ill-
specified. As a result, contracts must be long and detailed with negotiation and
litigation specifying their content. More critically, under common law, the
presumption is that what is not forbidden is permitted. Banks and other
providers of financial services can seek out lacunae in the law and gather for
themselves any first-mover advantages that may result from offering an
innovation. Particular firms may even develop a reputation for aggressiveness.
The result may be a constant competition in innovation.
In civil law systems the law is codified and explicit. As a result, contracts can
be short and general; the law specifies the details. However, the presumption is
that what is not permitted is forbidden. Kanda (1993) gives a fascinating
description of the Japanese case. (With the passage of a new foreign exchange law19
in 1980, Japan changed the rules governing the foreign exchange market in Japan
from "restriction in principle, freedom only as an exception" to "freedom in
principle, restriction only in exceptions.") Once a law is in place, there is
relatively little room for ex post litigation to determine the law's content.
Consequently, the negotiation and litigation that establishes the law's content
takes place before the actual passage of the Act authorizing the innovation.
The rule of "What is not permitted is forbidden" impedes private institutions
trying to force the pace of innovation because it results in the dissipation of first-
mover advantages. In Japan the government circulates the outline of any
proposed innovation to all interested parties for debate and negotiation before
authorizing the innovation (Kanda 1993). In France and Germany it is the
industry that helps draft the new rules (Coleman 1994).
3.2 Firm-specific factors include size and international reach
Firms differ in their ability to exploit country-specific advantages. The two
primary factors that appear to matter are the firm’s size and its international
reach. Large banks tend to have an international network of offices (Tschoegl
1983) though size and international reach are separable concepts.
Many large banks are relatively domestic and there are a number of smaller
banks that are highly international. A bank’s origins and history are an
important source of these differences. In 1915, Citibank acquired the
International Banking Company, a bank chartered in Connecticut in 1901 to20
operate in Asia (including Pacific Russia) and Latin America. Barclays Bank
incorporates the former Barclays DCO (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) Bank.
By contrast, Deutsche Bank, established to facilitate and handle German overseas
transactions, lost many of its international offices in or after World War I and
again in World War II; apparently it was slow to try a third time. Banque
Indosuez’s name signals its colonial origins. Japan’s Bank of Tokyo (descended
from the Yokohama Specie Bank and now merged into Mitsubishi Bank) was for
many years something of a flagship bank. It had an officially sanctioned role of
operating offices abroad. As a result Bank of Tokyo had more branches than any
other Japanese bank though it was never larger than the keiretsu banks such as
Fuji, Mitsubishi, Mitsui or Sumitomo.
Still, size matters, not so much for its own sake as for the signal that it gives
of a customer base. The signal is imperfect. Not all large banks have a strong
clientele of international corporations; some large banks are the central offices of
confederations of savings banks. Some apparently smaller banks such as Bankers
Trust may be good at arranging loans for an extensive base of corporate clients
but may choose not to retain the loans on their balance sheets. Still, large banks
do tend to be bankers to the corporate sector (Rhodes 1982).
Size may also correlate with safety, either through portfolio effects on the
variability of the firm’s results or through a belief that the regulatory authorities
will view the bank as too large to fail. In recent years regulators have forced
bank capitalization to grow with assets so larger banks will typically have a21
larger capitalization. All these considerations come together in the form of the
size of the risks the firm can take and the size of the position counterparties will
feel comfortable establishing with the firm (Jagtiani 1996).
International reach matters for at least four reasons. First, as Callier (1986)
argues, banks must have operations in at least the three major centers to be able
to compete in the foreign exchange market. Second, traders in banks with
trading rooms in different countries are better informed than traders operating
at a distance. Deutsche Bank’s traders trading DM for US$ in New York can
benefit from being able to talk to Deutsche Bank’s economists and DM/US$
traders in Frankfurt. Third, when Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) has a trading
room in Sydney it is easier for BNP to speak to its customers there in Strine and
during Australian business hours. Fourth, when Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC)
is making payments in Tokyo on behalf of customers in Basle, SBC may be able
to handle the entire transaction in-house if the recipient, say a Swiss MNC, has
an account with SBC’s Tokyo branch. Even if the transaction has to end in a local
bank, dealing with complications and unraveling mistakes is faster and easier if
SBC has personnel in Tokyo who can pursue the matter.
3.3 Country-specific effects on firm-specific sources of competitiveness
One cannot completely separate country and firm-specific factors. The two
sets of factors interact in complex ways to condition firms’ strategies. One way is22
through the effect on rivalry between firms. Another way is through processes
within the firm.
A country with an internationally important currency and several large
banks may generate a rivalrous domestic market. As Emery and Trist (1965)
point out in their seminal article, an environment of several large competitors
may become turbulent with an endogenous change-gradient. Competition for
the business of US firms between Citibank, Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan,
Bankers Trust and Goldman Sachs, among others, has resulted in pressure to
innovate. As Porter (1990) has argued, the “presence of strong local rivals is a
final, and powerful, stimulus to the creation and persistence of competitive
advantage.” Nickell (1996), writing on competition and corporate performance,
argues there are some theoretical reasons to believe that competition improves
corporate performance but that the reasons are not overwhelming and the
evidence is sparse. Still, his own results for a sample of some 670 UK companies
does provide some support for the view.
Having an important currency and large banks does not guarantee that a
rivalrous foreign exchange market will develop. First, the banks, though large,
may not have well-developed international networks of offices. Second, the
banks may not be competing.
The German, Italian and Japanese banks lost many of their overseas offices,
particularly those in London and New York, as a consequence of World War II.
Many of the banks appear to have been reluctant expanders for some years23
thereafter, perhaps because of caution, perhaps because of the priority of
rebuilding their domestic operations. In addition, the Ministry of Finance held
back the international expansion of Japanese banks until the early 1980s.
Banks may choose not to compete, unilaterally, or collusively, with the tacit
or actual approval of the domestic regulatory authorities. As a number of
observers have noted, the Swiss banks have been slow to expand abroad and
have apparently engaged in de facto mutual forbearance pacts with German
banks; Choi et al. (1986 and 1996) provide supporting statistical evidence. Also,
until at least the mid-1980s, many European banks responded to what they saw
as a potential enhanced competition due to the liberalization of banking in the
European Economic Community through cross-national partnerships such as
EBIC, Euro-Partners, Inter-Alpha, Orion and SFE-Abecor. Again, Choi et al.
(1986 and 1996) provide supporting statistical evidence. Banks may even enter
into pacts with regulators (Breton and Wintrobe 1978) or take part in the
regulatory system (Coleman 1994) in ways that mute domestic rivalry.
Lastly, national factors, including regulation, may affect processes within the
firm. Zaheer’s (1995) research shows that firms’ organization of their trading
rooms follows national patterns. Zaheer studied foreign exchange dealing rooms
in New York and Tokyo and found that differences between Japanese and
Western firms in their internal organization affected risk-taking and profits. The
trading rooms in Japanese banks followed a bureaucratic-clan control structure.
The Western firms followed a market control structure. The bureaucratic-clan24
firms tended to hire at entry level, had low bonuses relative to base salary and
used limits on traders’ open positions extensively to control trading. The market
control firms hired experienced traders, had large bonuses relative to salary and
made little use of position limits. The market control trading rooms produced
higher profits per trader although the positions were no larger on average than
in bureaucratic clan trading rooms.
Zaheer’s findings are consistent with Kogut’s (1991) argument that
technologies and management often diffuse more readily across industries
within a country than within an industry but across countries. Possible reasons
for this include legal and institutional factors that limit the profitability of
innovation and hysterisis and lock-in to current practice. Kogut argues that
learning is more difficult when the knowledge is know-how rather than
information. The know-how resides in relationships within institutions. To
adopt new practices means establishing new relationships.
The Japanese case is particularly interesting because one can observe the
pressures that arise from the incongruent demands of two markets. The Japanese
banks existed in a highly regulated and therefore placid environment (Emery
and Trist 1965) that permitted them to evolve in a way that, while not conducive
to developing expertise, was congruent with Japanese labor markets.
Deregulation and the advent of competition from foreign banks (Tschoegl 1988)
has increased the turbulence in the environment and is forcing the Japanese
banks to change. As Zaheer points out, the Japanese banks have used a25
generalist career path for their foreign exchange traders. However,
competitiveness in foreign exchange requires specialists. As Tateno (1993)
among others points out, the creation of a job category called “foreign exchange
dealers” presents an important issue for the future development of the Tokyo
market.
4.0 Testing the factors
4.1 We measure competitiveness by rank in league tables
Ideally, my dependent variable would be a measure of market share or
profitability dis-aggregated by firm and market. However, such data does not
exist. As far as market share data is concerned, the best data comes from the
triennial central bank surveys that the BIS has coordinated since 1989. However
the BIS does not release bank-by-bank figures and only provides aggregate
statistics for locations and currencies. As far as profitability is concerned, few
non-US banks break out their profits from their foreign exchange activities.
Those banks that do report foreign exchange profits do not disaggregate them by
currency or location. Even within the banks there are conceptual difficulties in
identifying the profitability of activities in particular locations and currencies.
For my dependent variables I have, therefore, created measures reflecting or
based on the rankings in Euromoney’s annual survey of foreign exchange
market competitiveness. Every year since 1976, Euromoney has mailed out a26
questionnaire to over a thousand banks and firms worldwide asking the
treasurers to rank their favorite banks for foreign exchange activities.
Euromoney then combines the results and issues rankings for overall
competitiveness and competitiveness in particular activities, locations and
currency markets.
Table 2 presents some data on the number of banks and firms that appeared
in Euromoney’s rankings in the 1985-89 and 1990-94 periods, and their national
origins. (The Top 100 in the Table refers to The Banker’s list of the 100 largest
banks, ranked by total assets.) In the 1990-94 period, the number of banks that
appeared in the rankings dropped by eight from the 1985-89 period’s 35. At the
same time, the number of banks that appeared in all five years of each period
rose from 5 to 13. These two facts together suggest that the identity of the major
firms in the market has become more stable. Firms coming from the US or the
UK are noticeably well-represented and banks from Germany and Japan are
noticeably absent or under-represented.
4.2 The home legal system may matter more than the home currency
Table 3 shows the results from regressions with a dependent variable that
consists of the number of different firms from each OECD country that appear in
the overall Euromoney rankings. The dependent variable therefore does not
reflect how strong these firms are; I pursue that issue in the next sub-section. For
the present investigation I use three independent variables.27
The first independent variable is the share of a country’s home currency in
total foreign exchange trading in the 1989 and 1992 BIS surveys (BIS 1993). The
hypothesis follows: the more important a currency is, the larger is the number of
banks from the currency’s home country that the market can sustain.
The second independent variable is a (1,0) dummy variable for countries
with a common law legal system. Here the argument is that a common law legal
system is particularly conducive to the innovation that supports the
competitiveness of firms.
The third independent variable is the number of banks from the country that
appear in The Banker’s list of the top 100 banks in the world (ranked by total
assets). One could reasonably expect that the number of top-rated banks a
country has would depend on the number of large banks that it has.
Because the dependent variable consists of count data, I use two estimation
techniques: OLS and the Poisson binomial model. I use two statistical methods
because if the two methods provide qualitatively similar results one can be
confident that the results do not depend critically on the statistical assumptions
underlying each method.
Also, I estimate the OLS regressions using standardized variables on both
sides and the Poisson regressions with standardized variables on the right side.
Bringing variables to a common metric (units of standard deviations from the
mean) facilitates comparisons of economic significance (McCloskey and Ziliak
1996). Tests of the statistical significance of the coefficients are not affected.28
The results in Table 3 suggest that the importance of the country’s currency
matters in determining the number of internationally competitive banks that a
country fields in the foreign exchange market. Whether or not the country has a
common law legal system also matters. Which matters more depends on the
estimation technique. The importance of the number of large banks within the
country also depends on the estimation technique. The ambiguity about the
relative importance reflects the high degree of correlation between the factors.
4.3 Firm size perhaps matters more than international spread
To investigate firm-specific factors I have first to control for country factors.
The simplest way to control for country factors is to perform separate tests on
banks from different countries. For these tests I have chosen to look at banks in
The Banker’s Top 100 (based on total assets) in 1985 and 1990 from five
countries. France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States
represent five of the six most important currencies (in terms of volume of
trading) in the foreign exchange markets. The Swiss Franc (SFr) is a more
important currency than the French Franc but my data contains only three large
Swiss banks. Even though the DM is the second most important currency,
Germany had no internationally competitive banks in the 1985-89 period.
For my dependent variable I have chosen to use an average rank-score for
each bank, based on each bank’s ranking in Euromoney’s survey. I give a bank a
score of 20 for a first-place ranking and a score of 1 for a twentieth-place ranking29
in a particular year. (Euromoney reports only the top 20 banks each year.) I then
average each bank’s score over a period to get its score for the period.
My two independent variables are measures of the size of each bank and of
its international spread. The size measure is the natural logarithm of each bank’s
total assets in 1985 or 1990. Size represents the bank’s customer base and reflects
economies of scale. The natural logarithm captures the notion of a decreasing
marginal influence of additional size.
To measure international spread I use the natural logarithm of the number of
financial centers (out of fourteen) in which each bank has an agency, branch or
subsidiary. The fourteen centers are from Choi et al. (1986). Only agencies,
branches or subsidiaries represent entities that the parent unambiguously
controls and that can book transactions. Tokyo forbids foreign banks to establish
subsidiaries and Canada forbids foreign banks to establish branches. The natural
logarithm captures a declining marginal contribution of additional spread.
Because the dependent variable consists of scores based on ranks, the
dependent variable cannot take on a value higher than 20 or lower than 0. I
therefore again use two statistical methods: OLS and Tobit with an upper and
lower bound. Tables 4a&b present the OLS results.
The goodness-of-fit in both periods is higher for the UK and US models than
for the French, German or Japanese models. Alternatively, the models work
better in common law countries than in code law countries. The cause is not the
importance of the home currency; sterling ranks fourth, after the DM and the30
¥en. The problem is that the code law countries have few rated banks and their
rank-scores are low; as a result, the dependent variable exhibits little variation.
Both size and the number of centers in which the bank operates have
generally positive effects. In the 1985-89 period, one cannot prefer one variable
to the other; in the 1990-94 period, size appears the more important variable.
Tables 5a & b present the Tobit results. The limited variation in the
dependent variable for the code law countries made it difficult to estimate
equations for Germany and Japan in the 1990-94 period. For the model covering
the German banks the algorithm pushed the effect of size as high as possible to
account for Deutsche Bank, while pushing the effect of international reach as low
as possible to account for the fact that many German banks had a reach equal to
or greater than Deutsche Bank’s but were not ranked in the market. The
algorithm was unable to estimate the model covering the Japanese banks.
For the 1985-89 period, the Tobit results suggest that international reach is
more important than size. For the 1990-94 period, the Tobit results appear to
favor size over reach, except for the US. This may be a consequence of large
banks becoming more similar on our reach variable with its ceiling.
4.4 Overall, domestic rivalry is key
In order to examine the combined effect of country-specific and firm-specific
factors I performed regressions of three independent variables on the rank-
scores of the Top 100 banks. (As in the case of the regressions in Tables 4 and 5,31
banks that never appeared in the Euromoney rankings received rank-scores of
zero.)
The analysis to this point suggests that country factors determine which
countries will generate internationally competitive firms and that firm-specific
factors determine which firms can benefit from the potential. I therefore created
two interactive independent variables. The first independent variable consists of
the product of three variables: the importance of the home country currency, the
natural logarithm of each bank’s total assets and the natural logarithm of the
number of centers in which the bank had a presence. The second independent
variable too consists of the product of three variables: the dummy variable for a
common law legal system, the natural logarithm of each bank’s total assets and
the natural logarithm of the number of centers in which the bank had a presence.
The two new independent variables combine each of the two most important
independent variables from the regressions in Table 3 with the independent
variables from Tables 4&5. The hypotheses are that: 1) large, internationally
active banks from countries with important currencies will be internationally
strong competitors; and 2) that large, internationally active banks from countries
with common law legal systems will be internationally strong competitors.
My third independent variable consists of the average rank-score of a bank’s
domestic competitors. The hypothesis is that firms with strong competitors will
themselves be strong competitors. For US money center banks I defined the set
of competitors as other money center banks plus Bank of America. For Japanese32
banks, the set was the major keiretsu city banks (Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo,
Sakura, Mitsubishi and Fuji) plus the Bank of Tokyo. For the German banks, the
set was the three largest banks: Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerz. For the
French banks, the set was Banque Nationale de Paris, Société Générale, Crédit
Lyonnais, Banque Indosuez and Compagnie Financière Parisbas. For the UK, the
set was the clearing banks plus Standard Chartered Bank.
As in the case of the regressions for Tables 4 and 5, I estimate both OLS and
Tobit models. Again, the independent variables are in standardized form (OLS
and Tobit), as is the dependent variable (OLS).
Table 6 presents the results. In both periods and for both estimation
methods, the strength of domestic competitors is the most important variable
determining a bank’s own competitiveness. For both periods and methods, the
interaction variable that incorporated the common law/code law dichotomy
proved to be more powerful than the interaction variable that incorporated the
importance of the currency.
Examination of the standardized residuals revealed two qualifications. The
models seriously underestimated the rank-scores of Citibank, Chase Manhattan,
Chemical, Barclays, Hongkong & Shanghai/Midland and Royal Bank of Canada.
Citibank, Barclays and Royal Bank of Canada at the time were the largest banks
in their home countries. More importantly, all these banks have international
networks of offices that are substantially more extensive than our variable for
presence in fourteen centers can capture.33
The second point is that firm-specific factors may occasionally matter
independently of interactions with country-specific factors. The regression for
the 1990-94 period substantially underestimated the international
competitiveness of Deutsche Bank and Union Bank of Switzerland. Both of these
banks were not competitive in the 1985-89 period but now are. Both are also the
largest banks in countries that happen, however, to have code law legal systems.
5.0 Competitiveness extends across time and currencies
5.1 Competitiveness continues from one period to the next
Table 7 presents the results of OLS models that regress each firm’s rank
score in the period 1990-94 on the firm’s rank score in the period 1985-89. The
population for Model 7.1 is all the commercial banks that entered into either
regression for the determinants of competitiveness. The population for Model 7.2
is all the commercial or investment banks that received a non-zero ranking in
either period. In both cases I accounted for mergers by associating the successor
firm with the higher of its two parents’ rank scores in the previous period.
As Table 7 shows, rank-scores persist. More importantly, an F-test does not
reject the constraints that the intercept is zero and that the slope coefficient is 1.
That is, if my data did not consist of rank scores I would not be able to reject the
null hypothesis of a random walk.34
The fact that Citibank has ranked first in the survey for some seventeen
consecutive years does not contradict this result. As Shaffer (1986) points out, a
Gibrat process (random walk of firm size) may generate rank stability and so
rank stability does not necessarily imply an absence of competition.
5.2 Competitiveness transfers across currencies
Competitiveness in one currency also appears to translate into
competitiveness in other currencies. This is not surprising when markets share a
currency; the competitiveness of US banks in the ¥en/US$ market carries
through the US$ to competitiveness in the DM/US$ market. However, a more
demanding test is whether competitiveness in a home-currency market translates
into competitiveness in third-currency markets. For example, can US banks
compete in the ¥en/DM market?
To investigate this issue I calculated average rank-scores for third-currency
banks in seven markets over the period 1990-1995. With 10 possible positions,
the average rank-score (across both home-currency and third-currency banks)
for a market is 5.5. (A score of 10 equals a first place ranking and a score of 1 a
tenth place ranking.) A rank score in Table 8a of less than 5.5 means that home-
currency banks have higher average rank-scores than do third-currency banks;
for instance, the average rank-score for the five non-US and non-UK banks that
Euromoney ranked in the top 10 in the US$/£stg market in the period was 3.1,
indicating that UK and US banks dominate the rankings there. A rank score of35
more than 5.5 means that third-currency banks have higher average scores than
do home-currency banks. As Table 8a shows, home-currency banks dominate in
six out of seven markets; the rank score of 5.8 means non-Japanese and non-
German banks dominate in the ¥en/DM market.
Next I regressed the scores from Table 8a on three dummy variables for the
US$, £stg, and SFr. Each of these dummy variables takes on a value of one if the
market in question includes the currency named in the variable, and zero
otherwise. Thus for the US$/£stg market, the three variables take on the values
(1,1,0). I expect the coefficients of the dummy variables to be negative because
the rank scores reflect the scores of third-currency banks. In the US$/£stg market
third-currency banks have to compete with US and UK banks and so their scores
will be lower. Table 8b presents the results.
The model shows that in a market that does not involve the US$, sterling or
the Swiss franc, the average rank-score for third-currency banks is about 5.5. In
markets against the US$ where US banks have a home-currency advantage, the
average rank score of the remaining banks is 1.7 points lower. In markets for
currencies against £stg or the SFr where British or Swiss banks have a home-
currency advantage, the average rank score of the remaining banks is 1 point
lower. In the ¥en/DM market, where the third-currency firms include US,
British and Swiss banks, the third-currency banks have a higher average rank
score than the German and Japanese banks in the market.36
Lastly, I also performed a disaggregated analysis, regressing the average
rank-score (across markets) of banks in third-currency markets on their overall
rank-score (Table 8c). In Model 8.1 the group consists of only those banks that
appeared in the rankings in third-currency markets. In Model 8.2 the group
consists of all those banks that appeared in the overall rankings, whether or not
the banks also appeared in the third-currency markets. The results clearly
demonstrate a positive correlation between a firm’s overall rank-score and its
rank-score in third-currency markets.
6.0 Conjecturing about the future
For me, the one surprising result of this paper was the importance of the
legal and regulatory system. I expected this to be a significant factor both
statistically and in terms of its role in explanation; I did not expect it to be more
important than the international role of the currency. The importance of the legal
and regulatory system may reflect a particular period in history after the
introduction of floating exchange rates and may mean less in the future.
Regulatory authorities in code law countries are amending their laws and
regulations and are permitting their institutions to develop new instruments,
contracts, markets and so forth. Under the pressure of competition, the firms
from those countries are adapting and learning. Also, firms from code law
countries are buying firms and hiring individuals from common law countries.37
This suggests that research into the country and firm determinants of the ability
to learn and to assimilate will prove a fruitful area for research.
Currently, US financial institutions dominate the foreign exchange markets
but their relative competitiveness may erode in the future. The major sources of
this potential erosion are obvious. Other currencies, especially the European
currency should one emerge, are chipping away at the pre-eminent role of the
US$. Additionally, the differences between countries in the scope of their
financial markets are shrinking. The interpenetration of financial centers through
the exchange of institutions means that competition is intense in all centers.
Many countries now have large, international financial institutions. However,
competitiveness appears to follow a random walk. Put another way,
competitiveness is contingent on many factors, and we can forecast the evolution
of only some of them, and those with only limited confidence.38
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Table 1a: London has the largest share of foreign exchange trading




    London 33% 33% 30% 26% 27% 30%
    New York 23% 24% 20% 16% 16% 16%
    Tokyo 3% 5% 16% 15% 11% 10%
    Daily volume (US$B) 75 150 300
1 717 1076 1572
Notes: (1) Based on extrapolation from data for the three centers only. (2) UK, US
and Japan.
Sources: Giddy (1979), BIS, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
Table 1b: The number of foreign banks represented in London, New York, and
Tokyo has grown
London (1) New York (2) Tokyo
Directly Indirectly
1970 159 22 75 61
1975 263 72 127
1980 352 50 253 149(3)




1993 425 325 170
1994 429 324
1995 450 326
Notes: (1) For London we have included the figures for the number of foreign
banks indirectly represented through their ownership of consortium banks
when this is available. We have no such data for New York or Tokyo. By the
late 1980s the number of surviving consortia is small. (2) For New York, the
numbers do not include banks represented through securities or investment
banking subsidiaries or subsidiaries engaged in other financial activities such
as consumer finance and leasing.  The numbers also do not include a number
of foreign-owned US banks that engage primarily in domestic banking
activity. (3) Average of figures for 1979 and 1981.
Sources:   The Banker, various issues. Banking System in Japan, Federation of
Bankers Associations of Japan, various issues.43
Table 2: Between 1985-1989 and 1990-1994, the number of the Top 100 banks that
are rated participants in the global foreign exchange market has declined
1985-89 1990-1994 Change
Number of banks named 35 27 -8
Number of banks named in all 5 years 5 13 8
Number of named banks also in Top
100
30 25 -5
Number of US investment banks named 2 2 0
Number of times banks were named
     United States 45 41 -4
     United Kingdom 18 23 5
     Australia 11 2 -9
     Japan 8 2 -6
     Canada 7 8 1
     France 4 3 -1
     Switzerland 2 10 8
     Germany 0 5 5
     Sweden & The Netherlands 5 6 1
Sources: Euromoney, May, 1985-95; The Banker, July, 1986 and 1991.44
Table 3: The number of internationally competitive firms in the foreign exchange
market that an OECD country has depends on whether or not the country has a
common law legal system, on the importance of its currency in foreign exchange
markets and on the number of large banks that it has.
Dependent variables: The total number of banks from the country that achieved
a Euromoney rank-score in the time period in question.
1985-89 1990-94
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
    Intercept -0.68 -0.53
(-1.98) (-1.81)
    Importance of currency 0.79 0.03 0.72 0.30
(6.54) (0.18) (5.53) (2.31)
    Common law legal system 0.22 0.83 0.26 0.61
(2.66) (3.54) (2.35) (2.65)
    No. of large banks 0.06 0.78 0.07 0.44
(0.52) (3.68) (0.54) (2.44)
    R
2 0.87 0.76
    SER 0.37 0.51
    F 50.0 23.6
    Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic 81.2 40.2
    C
2 26.4 32.1
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses. The number of observations is 25, representing the members of
the OECD.45
Table 4a: In the 1985-89 period, a bank’s rank-score depends on the bank’s size
or the bank’s international spread but it is not clear which factor is more
important.
Dependent variables: Average rank-scores (1985-89) for the largest banks
France Germany Japan UK US
     s (dep. variable) 1.09 0 1.28 5.53 7.04
    Ln(Assets) 0.55 0.05 0.57 0.82
(1.04) (0.23) (1.65) (4.24)
    Ln(Centers) 0.12 0.46 0.80 0.01
(0.22) (1.96) (2.34) (0.03)
    R
2 0.40 0.25 0.68 0.69
    SER 0.87 0.89 0.73 0.58
    F 1.31 3.47 3.21 17.41
    NOBs 6 9 23 5 18
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
Table 4b: In the 1990-94 period, a bank’s rank-score and size are positively
correlated, and for the UK and the US, so too are a bank’s rank-score and
international spread
Dependent variables: Average rank-scores (1990-94) for the largest banks
France Germany Japan UK US
    s (dep. variable) 0.31 3.40 0.09 7.30 7.47
    Ln(Assets) 0.45 1.18 0.50 0.84 0.57
(0.84) (3.93) (1.43) (29.4) (3.20)
    Ln(Centers) 0.02 -0.62 -0.13 0.35 0.47
(0.03) (-2.06) (-0.37) (12.4) (2.66)
    R
2 0.22 0.71 0.16 1.00 0.81
    SER 0.97 0.58 0.94 0.07 0.46
    F 0.70 8.46 2.20 666 17.2
    NOBs 7 9 25 7 10
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.46
Table 5a: In the 1985-89 period, a bank’s rank-score depends on the bank’s size
and the bank’s international spread with the spread being more important for
three out of four countries.
Dependent variables: Average rank-scores (1985-89) for the largest banks
France Germany Japan UK US
    Intercept -2.63 -6.63 7.99 1.48
(-1.23) (-1.71) (5.74) (0.64)
    Ln(Assets) 2.53 3.81 3.14 6.39
(1.26) (1.57) (2.14) (3.08)
    Ln(Centers) 3.37 3.42 4.41 6.97
(1.26) (2.50) (3.02) (1.56)
    LR Statistic 8.32 25.4 25.6 65.6
    NOBs 6 9 23 5 18
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
Table 5b: In the 1990-94 period, a bank’s rank-score and size are positively
correlated, and for the UK and the US, so too are a bank’s rank-score and
international spread
Dependent variables: Average rank-scores (1990-94) for the largest banks
France Germany Japan UK US
(1) (2)
    Intercept -0.55 -1.25 7.39 5.20
(-0.79) (-12.6) (21.8) (1.39)
    Ln(Assets) 0.74 7.67 6.11 3.13
(0.75) (113) (27.3) (1.51)
    Ln(Centers) -0.17 -5.21 3.27 13.7
(-0.02) (-37.3) (4.89) (1.66)
    LR Statistic 7.08 8.28 8.68 35.8
    NOBs 7 9 25 7 10
Notes: 1) Model failed to converge; results in the table report the situation at the
end of 25 iterations. 2) Singular Hessian. Bold type indicates statistical
significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are in parentheses.47
Table 6: Banks that are successful in foreign exchange markets have strong
competitors and tend to be large, international banks from countries with
common law legal systems.
Dependent variables: Rank-score in the time period in question.
1985-89 1990-94
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
    Intercept -3.27 -4.41
(-2.80) (-3.06)
    Currency*ln(Assets)*ln(Centers) 0.05 -0.45 0.16 0.86
(0.51) (-0.05) (2.13) (0.91)
    Common
law*ln(Assets)*ln(Centers)
0.19 2.61 0.27 2.92
(1.77) (2.38) (3.09) (2.63)
    Avg. rank-score of dom.
competitors
0.58 3.95 0.50 3.76
(5.68) (3.87) (5.18) (3.22)
    R
2 0.58 0.68
    SER 0.66 0.57
    F 43.1 67.6
    LR Statistic 233 200
    NOBs 97 97 98 98
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.48
Table 7: Performance persists; a firm’s rank-score in the period 1990-94 is equal
to its rank-score in the period 1985-89, plus random noise.
Dependent variable: Rank-score 1990-94
Model 7.1 Model 7.2
Commercial Banks Ranked Firms Only
     Intercept 0.17 0.90
(0.69) (0.98)
     Rank-score 1985-89 0.91 0.85
(16.4) (6.96)
     R
2 0.71 0.57
     SER 2.39 4.17
     F 270 48.4
     NOBs 115 39
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.49
Table 8a: In all but the ¥en/DM market, home-currency banks dominate the
rankings with the result that the average rank-scores of the third-currency banks
are below 5.5.
Third-currency banks (1990-95)








Source: Euromoney, May 1990-95.
Table 8b: US banks are the most competitive in third-currency markets, followed
equally by the British and the Swiss
Dependent variable: Average rank-score of third-currency banks in the seven
markets of Table 8a.
     Intercept 5.87
(29.7)
     US$ market -1.67
(-8.42)
     £stg market -1.02
(-4.33)
     SFr market -1.05
(-4.46)
     R
2 0.97
     SER 0.26
     F 28.7
     NOBs 7
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses50
Table 8c: A firm’s overall competitiveness carries over to third-currency markets.
Dependent variables: Firms’ rank-scores in third-currency markets.
Model 8.1 Model 8.2




     Intercept 0.10 0.02
(0.37) (0.10)
     Overall rank-score 1990-94 0.19 0.19
(6.01) (6.80)
     R
2 0.57 0.60
     F 36.1 46.2
     SER 1.02 0.97
     NOBs 28 33
Notes: Bold type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. t-statistics are
in parentheses.